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THE CARROLL TOWING COMPANY CASE AND THE TEACHING OF 
TORT LAW 
PATRICK J. KELLEY* 
I.  THE CASEBOOK METHOD AND ITS TEMPTATIONS 
“Taught law is tough law,” they say, and law professors have no reason to 
demur.  It stands to reason that most judges will accept without question those 
rules and principles they were taught as fundamental in law school.  Torts 
professors in 2001 teach the judges of 2026.  What we should teach, then, is 
not just an academic question. 
Moreover, law professors in the United States who teach common law 
subjects with casebooks have an extraordinary degree of freedom in deciding 
what is fundamental in their subject and how to teach it.  We have in this 
country fifty bodies of state tort law with fifty separate and unique histories, 
yet we profess to teach our students “tort law”—impliedly a single, unified 
body of law.  The casebook method enables us to maintain this mirage of a 
univocal tort law because the casebook authors get to choose which cases to 
include as emblematic or significant.1 
 
* Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law.  Thanks to Mark Grady for 
helpful comments. 
 1. This practice goes back to the first casebook—Christopher Columbus Langdell’s 
Casebook on Contracts, published in 1871.  C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871).  C.C. Langdell evidently believed that you could determine 
scientifically the true common law of contract, presumably applicable everywhere, by critical 
analysis of the meaning of doctrinal terms like offer, acceptance and consideration.  Langdell 
avoided a number of messy problems in the application of this methodology by using primarily 
English cases.  Grant Gilmore has speculated that Langdell must have engaged in some 
intellectual bludgeoning to get his students to see which meaning was the “true” meaning.  
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42-48 (1977).  Langdell’s subsequently 
published essay index to the second edition of his casebook revealed a rigidly dogmatic approach 
to doctrine, probably essential to achieve a single true contract law out of a welter of different 
decisions by different courts.  C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 
1880). 
  When competing or conflicting decisions are considered, the standpoint for discussion is 
not that of comparative law, where we illuminate our law by comparing it to the law of others.  
Instead, because we do not accept any state law as standard, our standpoint is the search for the 
single best or most sensible law. 
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Use of the casebook method to teach a purely hypothetical univocal tort 
law allows us to leave out altogether the history of the law in that jurisdiction, 
both the cases leading up to the chosen case, as well as the cases after it.  The 
casebook method further makes it easy for us to ignore altogether or scant the 
doctrinal and intellectual history of important tort terms and doctrines like 
negligence, duty and intent. 
Thus, although the casebook method is wonderfully adapted to teaching 
the basic lawyering skills of case analysis and synthesis, it seems to present 
obstacles to the effective teaching of substantive law.  The casebook method 
tempts us to give a vastly simplified picture of tort law, shorn of nuance and 
historical context.  That picture may greatly distort the law of every state 
because it is the law of none.  The picture may most accurately reflect just the 
theoretical or ideological commitments of the casebook authors. 
Although this tendency may be built into the enterprise of using the 
casebook method to teach “tort law” in the United States, the tendency can be 
combated or minimized.  One way to do so, not evidenced in any of the 
currently-published casebooks, is to use cases from just one state.2  This would 
allow us to put individual cases into historical and doctrinal context.  With 
adequate notes, this would allow our students to identify and explore 
differences between states by the comparative method, using the law of the 
standard state as the base for comparison. 
The most common way to minimize the distorting tendency of the 
casebook method is to provide notes putting emblematic cases into historical 
context, both doctrinal and intellectual, and sketching the extent to which the 
case has influenced legal developments in its own and other jurisdictions.  The 
extent to which this is done successfully, of course, differs from casebook to 
casebook. 
II.  CARROLL TOWING COMPANY IN THE CASEBOOKS 
The Carroll Towing Co. case3 and its famous formula for deciding 
negligence issues has been designated as emblematic and significant by 
unanimous vote of the authors of currently-published casebooks: each 
casebook gives the Carroll Towing Co. formula a prominent place in its 
treatment of the standard of conduct in negligence cases.4  The casebook 
 
 2. In the original version of Marc Franklin and Robert Rabin’s casebook, the authors used 
cases almost exclusively from New York and California.  MARC A. FRANKLIN, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES (1971).  That focus had become “less 
pronounced” by the fourth edition.  See Preface to MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES, at xxi (4th ed. 1987). 
 3. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 4. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 131-43 (10th ed. 2000); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 
190-96 (7th ed. 2000); DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 88-91 
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authors are not unanimous about the significance of the Carroll Towing Co. 
formula.  Some present it as the usual or ordinary meaning of the standard of 
conduct in negligence cases;5 most present it as one of two or more ways of 
establishing the standard of conduct;6 and others present it as an interpretation 
based on economic theory of the ordinary reasonable person standard.7  Only 
one casebook mentions that some courts use the Carroll Towing Co. test to 
decide controverted questions of duty.8 
In the materials surrounding the Carroll Towing Co. case, the casebook 
authors use notes and related cases in a number of different ways.  Most 
commonly, the notes and surrounding cases are used to teach the students how 
to apply the Hand formula and to give examples illuminating one or more of 
the elements in the formula.9  Also common, the notes and surrounding cases 
 
(2d ed. 1989); FRANK J. VANDALL & ELLEN WERTHEIMER, TORTS: CASES AND PROBLEMS 179-
83 (1997); DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 137-53 (4th ed. 2001); DOMINIC 
VETRI, TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 64-79 (1998); GEORGE C. CHRISTIE ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 132-45 (3d ed. 1997); ROBERT E. KEETON ET AL., CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW 10-11, 155-76 (3d ed. 1997); MARC A. 
FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 31-40 (6th ed. 1996); JAMES A. 
HENDERSON, JR., ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 178-82 (5th ed. 1999); JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL., 
TORT LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 232-39 (2d ed. 1997); VINCENT R. JOHNSON & 
ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 223-33 (1994); MARSHALL S. SHAPO, TORT 
AND INJURY LAW 174-77 (2d ed. 2000); MARK F. GRADY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 
346-73 (1994); JOSEPH W. LITTLE & LYRISSA BARNETT LIDSKY, TORTS: THE CIVIL LAW OF 
REPARATION FOR HARM DONE BY WRONGFUL ACT 76, 103-06, 222-29 (2d ed. 1997). 
 5. See GRADY, supra note 4, at 345; HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 179; KEETON ET 
AL., supra note 4, at 155-95, 254.  Those of us who have used a casebook for years, only to later 
find new meanings and new depths of understanding in the materials, will obviously approach 
with trepidation the question of categorizing the authors’ position on a question from the 
necessarily limited acquaintance with a casebook one does not teach.  Adding to this trepidation 
is the realization that some casebook authors purport to include material simply as an invitation to 
critical analysis, without endorsing any particular position.  Law professor lore has it that 
Professor Sturges at Yale put together and published a casebook comprised entirely of cases he 
thought were wrongly decided.  See WESLEY A. STURGES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW 
OF ADMINISTRATION OF DEBTORS’ ESTATES (1933).  The categorizations in this and subsequent 
footnotes are therefore presented tentatively and with apologies in advance to any author whom I 
have offended. 
 6. See DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 4; EPSTEIN, supra note 4; VANDALL & 
WERTHEIMER, supra note 4; VETRI, supra note 4; CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 4; SCHWARTZ ET 
AL., supra note 4; FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 4; JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 4, at 233; 
SHAPO, supra note 4. 
 7. PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 4, at 232, 239; LITTLE & LIDSKY, supra note 4, at 76, 222-
29. 
 8. LITTLE & LIDSKY, supra note 4. 
 9. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 4; VETRI, supra note 4; ROBERTSON ET AL., supra 
note 4; GRADY, supra note 4; DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 4; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4; 
JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 4. 
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are used to compare and, perhaps, equate the Hand formula with the 
unreasonable foreseeable risk definition of negligence,10 as embodied in 
sections 291 through 293 of the Second Restatement of Torts.11  Often the 
authors will put the formula into a theoretical context, explaining its affinity to 
the law and economics explanation of negligence law12 (usually citing Posner’s 
Theory of Negligence13 or Landes & Posner’s The Economic Structure of Tort 
Law14).  In the course of this, some authors explain the relationship between 
the formula and marginal analysis;15 some explain Mark Grady’s critique that 
the formula does not explain the courts’ recurring conclusion that inadvertence 
resulting in breach of a known safety standard is always negligence;16 and 
many point out the difficulty in quantifying the elements of the formula,17 
citing Judge Hand himself in either Conway v. O’Brien,18 or Moisan v. Loftus19 
or Judge Posner in McCarty v. Pheasant Run, or United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co. v. Jadranska Slobodno Plovidba.20 
The casebook authors generally do not attempt to put Carroll Towing Co. 
into historical context.  No one suggests a possible source for or influence on 
the Hand formula.  With two exceptions,21 the authors fail to give enough of 
 
 10. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 4, at 139-43; ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 4; 
CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 135-40; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 172-76; HENDERSON 
ET AL., supra note 4, at 180; SHAPO, supra note 4, at 174-75. 
 11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-293 (1965). 
 12. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 4, at 228-30; EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 191-96; 
DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 4, at 150; CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 137-39; FRANKLIN & 
RABIN, supra note 4, at 36-37; PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 4, at 237; GRADY, supra note 4, at 
352-55. 
 13. DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 4, at 150; CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 137-39; 
FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 4, at 36-37; PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 4, at 237. 
 14. EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 193-94; GRADY, supra note 4, at 352. 
 15. EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 193; JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 4, at 229; GRADY, supra 
note 4, at 353-55. 
 16. JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 4, at 229-30; EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 194-195; DOBBS 
& HAYDEN, supra note 4, at 151; VETRI, supra note 4, at 71; FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 4, 
at 38-39; GRADY, supra note 4, at 373-78 (quoting Landes and Posner). 
 17. See EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 192; JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 4, at 228; VETRI, 
supra note 4, at 65; SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 4, at 141; CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 
137; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 11; FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 4, at 38; PHILLIPS ET 
AL., supra note 4, at 238; HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 181; LITTLE & LIDSKY, supra note 
4, at 225. 
 18. JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 4, at 228; VETRI, supra note 4, at 65; SCHWARTZ ET AL., 
supra note 4, at 141; CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 137. 
 19. EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 192; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 11; HENDERSON ET AL., 
supra note 4, at 181; LITTLE & LIDSKY, supra note 4, at 225. 
 20. VETRI, supra note 4, at 72-76; FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 4, at 38; PHILLIPS ET AL., 
supra note 4, at 232-38; JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 4, at 228; LITTLE & LIDSKY, supra note 
4, at 226-29. 
 21. GRADY, supra note 4, at 346-47; CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 135-36. 
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the opinion to show how Judge Hand applied the test to the facts of the Carroll 
Towing Co. case itself.  With one exception,22 the authors fail to refer to any 
prior case in Learned Hand’s court dealing with allegations of negligence on 
similar facts—the absence of a bargee on board a barge moored to a pier.  No 
author gives any indication of whether that court continued to adhere to the 
narrow holding in the case.  Few authors try to tell the students whether the 
Carroll Towing Co. test is used frequently or infrequently.  Those who do23 
often content themselves with a brief cite to Stephen Gilles’s24 lament that 
judges do not instruct juries to use the Hand formula in deciding negligence 
questions. 
I believe that the failure of our casebooks to place the Carroll Towing Co. 
test in historical context persistently distorts the significance of the case and 
the Hand formula that it contains.  The rest of this paper will try to put the 
Carroll Towing Co. case into its appropriate historical context. 
III.  THE CARROLL TOWING COMPANY CASE AS A COMMON-LAW PRECEDENT 
The Carroll Towing Co. case arose out of the sinking of the barge, Anna C, 
on January 2, 1944, in the North River off a pier in Manhattan.25  The Anna C 
had been moored to the end of Pier 52.  Five other barges had been moored in 
a line outside her, the tier all held together by mooring lines.  The fourth barge 
out was also connected by a line to the end barge in a similar tier of four barges 
extending out from the Public Pier immediately to the north.  The tug Carroll 
was ordered by the harbor master to shift the second barge in the tier attached 
to that Public Pier.  To get to the barge to be moved, they had to remove the 
line between the two tiers.  The harbor master and a deckhand from the tug 
went onto the tier of barges extending from Pier 52, readjusted the lines 
between the barges, readjusted the two lines between the Anna C and Pier 52, 
and finally threw off the line between the two tiers.  While the deckhand and 
the harbor master were readjusting these lines, the tug stayed at the end of the 
tier, pulling on a line made fast to the end boat to hold the tier in place.  
Shortly after all the lines were readjusted, the tug released its holding line and 
moved away from the tier.  The Anna C then broke loose from the pier and the 
 
 22. GRADY, supra note 4, at 349-51 (explaining the Kathryn B. Guinan, 176 F. 301 (2d Cir. 
1910) and O’Donnell Transp. Co. v. M & J Tracy, Inc., 150 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter 
The Reno]).  See also MARK GRADY, PROBLEM SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
TORTS 107-08 (1996), giving as a problem the facts of the D.L. and W. No. 442, 30 F.2d 250 (2d 
Cir. 1929). 
 23. CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 139; JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 4, at 229; 
FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 4, at 39. 
 24. Stephen Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1016 (1994), cited in 
CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 139; FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 4, at 39. 
 25. The facts in this paragraph are taken from Judge Hand’s opinion for the court, 159 F.2d 
169, 170-71 (2d Cir. 1947). 
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whole tier of barges went adrift.  The Anna C drifted into a Navy tanker 
berthed at a downwind pier.  The collision punched a hole in the Anna C below 
the water line.  The hole was not immediately discovered; the Anna C was 
pushed into the slip between the two piers by an assisting tug, and shortly 
thereafter sank. 
The trial court, sitting in admiralty without a jury, found that the owner of 
the cargo on the Anna C could recover from the owner of the tug (Carroll 
Towing Co., Inc.) for the negligence of the tug captain and its deckhand, and 
from the employer of the harbor master (Grace Line, Inc.) for the harbor 
master’s negligence in readjusting the mooring lines.26  The trial court found 
that the owner of the barge (Conners Marine Co., Inc.) was not negligent in 
failing to have a bargee on board at the time of the accident.27  In support of 
this conclusion, the court cited three reported28 and two unreported prior29 
cases holding that the absence of a vessel’s captain was not negligence when 
the vessel was left, at rest, adequately moored. 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reversed the trial court on the question of the barge owner’s negligence.30  In a 
famous opinion by Judge Learned Hand, the court found that the Anna 
C would still have broken loose even if the bargee had been on board, because 
the harbor master had the authority to readjust all the lines in the tier and any 
protest by the bargee would have been fruitless.  A bargee on board, however, 
would have discovered the hole immediately after the collision and obtained 
help to keep the barge afloat long enough to beach her and save the cargo.  The 
barge owner was therefore responsible, along with the tug owner and the 
harbor master’s employer, for the “sinking damages”—the damage solely 
attributable to the Anna C’s sinking. 31  The barge owner was not responsible 
for the damages caused immediately by the collision. 
In discussing the barge owner’s negligence, Judge Hand first canvassed the 
precedents dealing with the negligence of a barge or ship owner in leaving a 
moored vessel unattended.  Hand added ten additional cases to the three 
published cases relied on by the lower court.  Introducing these thirteen cases, 
Hand said, “we cannot agree that [the bargee’s absence from his barge] is 
never ground for liability.32  Hand went on to give a brief statement of the 
 
 26. Connors Marine Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 66 F. Supp. 396, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1946) 
[hereinafter The Joseph F. Carroll]. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.  (citing The Kathryn B. Guinan, 176 F. 301 (2d Cir. 1910); United States Trucking 
Corp. v. City of New York, 14 F.2d 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1926); The Trenton, 72 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 
1934)). 
 29. Id. (citing Schmutz v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., (1926); The Baltimore, (1934)). 
 30. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 172. 
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holding of each case.33  Of the thirteen cases, the court had found the bargee or 
captain’s absence to be negligence in seven of them,34 and found no 
negligence, or at least no liability, in six of them.35 
 
 33. Judge Hand’s summary is as follows: 
 As early as 1843, Judge Sprague in Clapp v. Young, held a schooner liable which broke 
adrift from her moorings in a gale in Provincetown Harbor, and ran down another ship.  
The ground was that the owners of the offending ship had left no one on board, even 
though it was the custom in that harbor not to do so.  Judge Tenney in Fenno v. The Mary 
E. Cuff, treated it as one of several faults against another vessel which was run down, to 
leave the offending vessel unattended in a storm in Port Jefferson Harbor.  Judge Thomas 
in The On-The-Level held liable for damage to a stake-boat, a barge moored to the stake-
boat “south of Liberty Light, off the Jersey shore,” because she had been left without a 
bargee; indeed he declared that the bargee’s absence was “gross negligence.”  In the 
Kathryn B. Guinan, Ward, J., did indeed say that, when a barge was made fast to a pier in 
the harbor, as distinct from being in open waters, the bargee’s absence would not be the 
basis for the owner’s negligence.  However, the facts in that case made no such holding 
necessary; the offending barge in fact had a bargee aboard though he was asleep.  In The 
Beeko, Judge Campbell exonerated a power boat which had no watchman on board, which 
boys had maliciously cast loose from her moorings at the Marine Basin in Brooklyn and 
which collided with another vessel.  Obviously that decision has no bearing on the facts at 
bar.  In United States Trucking Corporation v. City of New York, the same judge refused 
to reduce the recovery of a coal hoister, injured at a foul berth, because the engineer was 
not on board; he had gone home for the night as was apparently his custom.  We reversed 
the decree, but for another reason.  In The Sadie, we affirmed Judge Coleman’s holding 
that it was actionable negligence to leave without a bargee on board a barge made fast 
outside another barge, in the face of storm warnings.  The damage was done to the inside 
barge.  In The P.R.R. No. 216, we charged with liability a lighter which broke loose from, 
or was cast off, by a tanker to which she moored, on the ground that her bargee should not 
have left her over Sunday.  He could not know when the tanker might have to cast her off.  
We carried this so far in The East Indian, as to hold a lighter whose bargee went ashore 
for breakfast, during which the stevedores cast off some of the lighter’s lines.  True, the 
bargee came back after she was free and was then ineffectual in taking control of her 
before she damaged another vessel; but we held his absence itself a fault, knowing as he 
must have, that the stevedores were apt to cast off the lighter.  The Conway No. 23 went 
on the theory that the absence of the bargee had no connection with the damage done to 
the vessel itself; it assumed liability, if the contrary had been proved.  In The Trenton, we 
refused to hold a moored vessel because another outside of her had overcharged her fasts.  
The bargee had gone away for the night when a storm arose; and our exoneration of the 
offending vessel did depend upon the theory that it was not negligent for the bargee to be 
away for the night; but no danger was apparently then to be apprehended.  In Bouker 
Contracting Co. v. Williamsburgh Power Plant Corporation, we charged a scow with half 
damages because her bargee left her without adequate precautions.  In O’Donnell 
Transportation Co. v. M. & J. Tracy, we refused to charge a barge whose bargee had been 
absent from 9 A.M. to 1:30 P.M., having “left the vessel to go ashore for a time on his 
own business.” 
Id. at 172-73 (citations omitted). 
 34. Clapp v. Young, 5 F. Cas. 819 (D. Mass 1843); Fenno v. The Mary E. Cuff, 84 F. 719 
(E.D.N.Y. 1897) [hereinafter The Mary E. Cuff]; The On-The-Level, 128 F. 511 (E.D.N.Y. 1903); 
New York Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Fulton Lighterage Co., 57 F.2d 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1932) 
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In the seven cases in which the absence of the captain or bargee was held 
to be negligence, three captains had left their vessel untended in a storm or 
with warnings of an approaching storm threatening danger;36 one captain left 
his barge moored to a stake-boat in open waters;37 one bargee left his scow 
without taking precautions against a danger he knew about,38 and two lighter 
captains left their lighters moored to a ship they were unloading,39 knowing in 
one case that the ship might cast the lighter off during the time he was gone40 
and in the other case41 that the stevedores might rearrange the lines during 
unloading.  In both cases, the lighter’s captain could not be sure that those who 
were not primarily responsible for the lighter would remoor her adequately. 
In the six cases of no liability, two bargees42 had left their barges, 
adequately moored, overnight, and one who had moored his vessel adequately 
was onboard but asleep overnight without a watchman.43  One captain had left 
his power boat moored in a marine basin without a watchman and mischievous 
boys maliciously cast her loose.44  One captain was not on board his vessel 
while it was being towed, but there was no evidence that a captain on board 
would have prevented the damage.45  In one case—The Reno46—the bargee 
had been gone “on his own business” from 9:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. on the day 
the barge sank, but had sounded the barge just before he left and determined 
that the water in the hold had not risen since the night before.47  The damage to 
the barge from its being jammed against another barge as it was being towed 
earlier that morning could not have been detected before the bargee left, then, 
as the court found that the hole which sunk the barge was caused by ice that 
 
[hereinafter The Sadie]; Christie Scow Corp. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 56 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 
1932) [hereinafter The P.R.R. No. 216]; The East Indian, 62 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 1932); Bouker 
Contracting Co. v. Williamsburgh Power Plant Corp., 130 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1942) [hereinafter The 
73-H]. 
 35. The Kathryn B. Guinan, 176 F. 301 (2d Cir. 1910); The Beeko, 10 F.2d 884 (E.D.N.Y. 
1925); United States Trucking Co. v. City of New York, 14 F.2d 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1926); The 
Conway No. 23, 64 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1933); The Trenton, 72 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1934); O’Donnell 
Transp. Co. v. M & J Tracey, 150 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter The Reno]. 
 36. Clapp, 5 F. Cas. at 820; The Mary E. Cuff, 84 F. at 720; The Sadie, 57 F.2d at 908. 
 37. The On-The-Level, 128 F. at 511-12. 
 38. The 73-H, 130 F.2d at 97-98. 
 39. The P.R.R. No. 216, 56 F.2d at 604; The East Indian, 62 F.2d at 243. 
 40. The P.R.R. No. 216, 56 F.2d at 604. 
 41. The East Indian, 62 F.2d at 244. 
 42. United States Trucking Corp. v. City of New York, 14 F.2d 528, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1926); 
The Trenton, 72 F.2d 283, 285 (2d Cir. 1934). 
 43. The Kathryn B. Guinan, 176 F. 301, 301-02 (2d Cir. 1910). 
 44. The Beeko, 10 F.2d 884, 884-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1925). 
 45. The Conway No. 23, 64 F.2d 121, 121 (2d Cir. 1933). 
 46. The Reno, 150 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 47. Id. at 736. 
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had been jammed against the port stern of the barge, which stoppered the hole 
it had caused until the ice gradually melted.48 
Judge Hand concluded from this review of the relevant precedent that no 
general rule existed on the issue of whether the absence of a bargee from a 
moored barge constituted negligence.  Instead of distinguishing or extending 
the specific holdings of the prior cases, Judge Hand purported to derive a 
general liability test from the cases taken as a whole: 
It becomes apparent why there can be no such general rule, when we consider 
the grounds for such a liability.  Since there are occasions when every vessel 
will break from her moorings, and since, if she does, she becomes a menace to 
those about her; the owner’s duty, as in other similar situations, to provide 
against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability 
that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) 
the burden of adequate precautions.  Possibly it serves to bring this notion into 
relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; 
and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied 
by P: i.e., whether B < PL.49 
In applying this test to the facts, Judge Hand started sensibly enough, 
focusing on “the likelihood that a barge will break from her fasts and the 
damage she will do.”50  He concluded that the danger is greater when the barge 
(as here) “is in a crowded harbor where moored barges are constantly being 
shifted about.”51  This obviously goes to the probability of harm and the 
gravity of harm parts of the formula.  But Judge Hand then went on to an 
extended discussion of the bargee’s excuse for his absence from the barge.  
Judge Hand started by asserting that “the barge must not be the bargee’s 
prison, even though he lives aboard; he must go ashore at times.”52  He might 
not need to be aboard at night at all, Hand continued, and if the custom is to go 
ashore at night, that might be controlling.53  Here, however, the accident took 
place during working hours and the bargee had been ashore for the preceding 
twenty-one hours, with no good excuse.  The court concluded that, under the 
circumstances (barges constantly being drilled in and out in a wartime crowded 
harbor, in winter with limited daylight hours), it was “not beyond reasonable 
expectation” that the work of drilling the barges in and out might be done 
negligently.54  The court therefore held that “it was a fair requirement that the 
 
 48. Id. at 736-37. 
 49. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 172-73 (distinguishing, implicitly, United States Trucking Corp. v. City of New 
York, 14 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1926); The Trenton, 72 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1934); and The Kathryn 
B. Guinan, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949)). 
 54. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 174. 
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Conners Company should have a bargee aboard (unless he had some excuse 
for his absence), during the working hours of daylight.”55 
The court’s emphasis on the bargee’s unexcused absence has troubled 
Professor Richard Epstein.56  In the context of Judge Hand’s announced 
formula for deciding the case, the bargee’s excuse seems relevant only in 
determining the extent of the burden on the defendant to keep the barge 
manned.  Professor Epstein pointed out that the defendant is the barge owner, 
however, not the bargee.57  He argued that the burden on the barge owner 
would be about the same to keep a bargee on board at all times during working 
hours, or to keep a bargee on board during working hours except when he has a 
good excuse for his absence.58  Since there were living quarters on board, it 
could not be much more expensive to the barge owner to pay a bargee to stay 
on board without going ashore at all during working hours, than to pay a 
bargee to stay on board during working hours except when he had a good 
reason for going ashore. 
Judge Hand’s emphasis on the bargee’s unexcused absence is 
understandable if we take the case out of the context of his announced test and 
put it back into the context of the Second Circuit’s specific precedents on the 
negligence of an absent captain or bargee.  We can then read Judge Hand’s 
discussion of the application of his test to the facts of this case as both an 
application of his formula and a way of distinguishing the prior relevant cases. 
When Judge Hand concluded that, under the circumstances, it was 
reasonably foreseeable that the work of drilling the barges in and out might be 
done negligently, that seemed to bring the facts of this case squarely within the 
negligence holdings of the two lighterage cases.  The lighterage cases, though, 
both share a fact that make them clearly distinguishable: in both those cases,59 
the lighter’s captain, had he been aboard, would have had clear authority to 
control the remooring of the lighter after her lines had been cast off or 
rearranged.  In the Carroll Towing Co. case, the harbor master had that 
authority.  Moreover, since the Anna C broke loose while the harbor master 
was still in the process of drilling out a barge, there was no time after the 
harbor master had remoored the Anna C and before the Anna C broke loose 
that a bargee aboard could have reassumed authority and responsibility for her 
moorings.  So the question then becomes whether the absence of the bargee 
was negligence in relation to the risk that the barge might sink after collision 
with the Navy tanker.  That question, however, seems to identify The Reno as 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 155-56 (1973). 
 57. Id. at 155. 
 58. Id. 
 59. The P.R.R. No. 216, 56 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1932); The East Indian, 62 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 
1932). 
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the controlling authority.  In that case, the Second Circuit had held that the 
absence of a bargee ashore on his own business for four and a half hours 
during working hours, while his barge was sinking, was not negligence.60  The 
only eligible distinction between The Reno and Carroll Towing, then, seems to 
be that the bargee in The Reno had a good excuse to be gone while the Anna 
C’s bargee did not. 
But is that really a persuasive way to distinguish The Reno?  If we follow 
The Reno holding and assume in Carroll Towing that it is not negligent for a 
bargee to leave a properly-moored barge to pursue his own legitimate concerns 
during working hours, the obvious issues in this case would be alternative 
questions of proximate cause and cause-in-fact.  The cause-in-fact problem is 
this: The bargee was absent without a good excuse.  His presence could have 
prevented the harm—at least the “sinking damages.”  So, from one 
perspective, his absence was a cause-in-fact of the harm.  But if he had had a 
good excuse, he could have been absent at the time of the collision without 
being negligent, and the harm would still have occurred.  So, from another 
perspective, his absence without a good excuse was not a cause-in-fact of the 
harm.  It all depends on which way you change the bargee’s conduct to make it 
non-negligent in applying the “but-for,” or necessary condition test for cause-
in-fact.61 
The problem can be recast in proximate cause terms.  Under the practice 
held to be due care by the court in The Reno, bargees may be absent without 
negligence for extended periods of time during working hours when they have 
a good excuse.  If that is so, the purpose of the practice cannot be to prevent 
every kind of harm.  Since the bargee was not on the barge all the time, any 
safety purpose for the bargee’s presence when he was there would have to be a 
secondary, back-stopping purpose.  The practice of allowing bargees to leave 
at times shows that the barge owner expected the harbor master and the tugs at 
his direction to take primary responsibility for the safety of moored barges in 
these flotillas.  In holding that the barge owner was not responsible for 
“collision” damages, Judge Hand recognized this allocation of primary 
responsibility to the harbor master: since the harbor master would have ignored 
 
 60. The Reno, 150 F.2d 735, 736 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 61. In applying the “but-for” or necessary condition test for cause-in-fact, the courts 
ordinarily construct a hypothetical in which all the other facts of the case are the same, but the 
negligent party’s conduct is changed just enough so he would not be negligent.  Then you ask 
whether, in that hypothetical, the injury would still have occurred.  In the Carroll Towing Co. 
case, the bargee’s conduct could be changed in two different ways to make it non-negligent, 
under the court’s assumptions: (1) you could make the bargee non-negligent by having him on the 
barge at all relevant times, or (2) you could give the bargee a good excuse to be gone from the 
barge at the relevant time.  Obviously, in the second hypothetical, the same injury would have 
happened in exactly the same way, so the bargee’s negligence in being gone without a good 
excuse is not a cause-in-fact of the injury here. 
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any bargee’s protests while the harbor master was reworking the mooring 
lines, the barge owner is not liable for damages caused just by the harbor 
master’s bungled remooring.  Judge Hand therefore limited the barge owner’s 
liability to the “sinking” damages, which could have been avoided had a 
bargee been on board during the collision.  This limited liability seems to 
reflect the secondary, back-stopping role of the bargee when he is on board a 
moored barge, but it leaves out of account the fact that, according to the 
practice, the bargee could at any time be ashore.  The harbor master, therefore, 
in fulfilling his role could only rely on the bargee’s backstopping role to avoid 
harm of gradual onset, such as an improperly remoored line that over the 
course of a day or two wore away.  The bargee, even if he were away for 
excused excursions ashore, should discover that kind of a problem.  Here, 
however, the barge drifted off immediately after the harbor master removed the 
lines. In these circumstances, then, the sinking would have occurred even if the 
bargee had been ashore just briefly on an excused errand.  From the harbor 
master’s viewpoint, it is simply fortuitous in a case like this whether the bargee 
is ashore with or without a good excuse.  Under these circumstances, the 
subsidiary, back-stopping safety purpose of having a bargee aboard some of 
the time has no relevance to the liability question here.  Put a different way, 
this argument shows that the sinking of the Anna C here did not come about 
from the hazards the practice of keeping a bargee on board some but not all of 
the time was intended to prevent.62 
Judge Hand’s emphasis on the bargee’s excuse in the Carroll Towing Co. 
case suggests that in applying the negligence calculus he deferred to the good 
practice norm recognized in The Reno.  Unfortunately, by not focusing on the 
purpose of the customary norm he deferred to, he missed the crucial issue in 
the case, and reached a result that seems unsupportable in light of prior 
precedent and the coordination in practices they had recognized as acceptable. 
IV.  INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE HAND FORMULA 
Judge Hand’s famous formula for determining negligence, announced in 
the Carroll Towing Co. opinion, bears repeating here: 
Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from her moorings, and 
since, if she does, she becomes a menace to those about her; the owner’s duty, 
as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function 
 
 62. The bargee’s negligence in being absent without an excuse would therefore not be a 
proximate cause of the sinking damages, under either the “hazard prevented by the social rule” 
test, or the “within the unreasonable foreseeable risk that made the party negligent in the first 
place” test for proximate causation.  See generally Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in 
Negligence Law: History, Theory, and The Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 87-90, 99-
101 (1991) (explaining overlap between “hazard” test of proximate cause and “within the 
foreseeable risk” test of proximate cause). 
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of three variables: (1) the probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity 
of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions.  
Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if 
the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends 
upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.63 
Where did this formula come from?  It seems to explain the absent bargee 
cases summarized by Judge Hand in his preceding paragraph, but none of the 
opinions in those cases mentioned these factors in justifying the court’s 
decision, and any number of other lower-level generalizations could plausibly 
explain this set of cases.64  Moreover, Judge Hand had expressed this same 
understanding of the appropriate test of negligence, without the algebraic 
notation, over six years before in Conway v. O’Brien,65 an automobile accident 
case.  There, Judge Hand had said: “The degree of care demanded of a person 
by an occasion is the resultant of three factors: the likelihood that his conduct 
will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and 
balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.”66  
Judge Hand’s explanation of the negligence standard in Conway and Carroll 
Towing was not that ordinarily given by judges in the 1940s.  Most judges at 
that time explained the negligence standard in terms of the conduct of the 
ordinary reasonable man.67 
Where, then, did Judge Hand get his formula?  We know from his 
biographers that Learned Hand was an intellectually ambitious and progressive 
judge, alive to the latest currents of thought in the legal community.68  This 
found expression in many ways, including Judge Hand’s early membership in 
the American Law Institute (ALI) and his vigorous support for its project of 
restating the common law.69  This suggests that a likely source for Hand’s 
description of the negligence standard would be the Restatement of the 
Division of the Law Relating to Negligence,70 approved by the ALI at its 
annual meeting in 1934.  Sure enough, when we turn to that Restatement we 
find negligence explained as conduct posing an unreasonable foreseeable risk 
 
 63. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 64. One might say the cases stand for the following generalization: when a vessel is not in 
operation, but adequately moored at a place of rest, the absence of the vessel’s captain is 
negligence only when a warned-of storm threatening the safety of the moored vessel would have 
led a prudent captain, following ordinary good practice, to stay or return to keep the vessel and 
those around it safe during the storm. 
 65. 111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940). 
 66. Id. at 612. 
 67. See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 224-55 (1941); 
38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 30, at 676-78 (1941). 
 68. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 190-415 (1994). 
 69. Id. at 410-15. 
 70. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS, vol. 2, NEGLIGENCE (1934) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT]. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
744 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:731 
of harm to another.71  The Restatement defined an unreasonable risk as “one of 
such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or 
of the particular manner in which it is done.”72  The Restatement went on to 
list factors to be considered in determining the utility of the actor’s conduct,73 
as well as factors considered in determining the magnitude of the risk.74 
Judge Hand’s statements in Carroll Towing Co. and Conway v. O’Brien of 
the factors relevant to a negligence determination could be seen as an 
elegantly, concise summary of the Restatement’s more elaborate cost-benefit 
standard for determining whether a foreseeable risk is an unreasonable one.  
There are differences between the Hand formula and the Restatement’s 
formula, however, and while those differences are subtle they may 
nevertheless be significant.  The Restatement says that an act is negligent if “a 
reasonable man would recognize [that it] involve[s] a risk of harm to another” 
when the “risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the 
utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.”75  The 
Restatement goes on to identify the three factors important in determining the 
utility of the actor’s conduct: “(a) the social value which the law attaches to the 
interest which is to be advanced or protected by the conduct; (b) the extent of 
the chance that this interest will be advanced or protected by the particular 
course of the conduct; and (c) the extent of the chance that such interest can be 
adequately advanced or protected by another and less dangerous course of 
conduct.”76  Judge Hand’s test does not refer to the utility of the actor’s 
conduct or to these three factors for determining that “utility.”  Instead he 
refers to “[t]he burden of adequate precautions.”77  The Restatement formula 
also identifies factors important in determining the magnitude of the risk: “(a) 
the social value which the law attaches to the interests which are imperiled; (b) 
the extent of the chance that the actor’s conduct will cause an invasion of any 
interest of the other or of one of a class of which the other is a member; (c) the 
extent of the harm likely to be caused to interests imperiled; and (d) the 
number of persons whose interests are likely to be invaded if the risk takes 
effect in harm.”78  Judge Hand’s test does not use the magnitude of the risk 
phrase or the four factors the Restatement says are relevant to determining that 
magnitude.  Instead, he refers to the probability of harm and the gravity of the 
resulting injury. 
 
 71. Id. § 291. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. § 292. 
 74. Id. § 291(1). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. § 292. 
 77. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 78. RESTATEMENT § 293. 
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Is there any significance to the apparent differences between the Hand 
formula and the Restatement formula?  The only thing in the Restatement’s 
unreasonable foreseeable risk test clearly missing from Hand’s simplified 
reformulation is the initial requirement that the risk of harm to another be one 
that a reasonable man would recognize.79  One could argue that Judge Hand 
formulated his test as a simplified version of the second part of the 
Restatement test, and assumed that the question of whether there was a 
foreseeable risk of harm to another would already be answered before the court 
proceeded on to the Hand formula for determining whether that risk is 
unreasonable.  Certainly, in the Carroll Towing Co. case itself, Judge Hand 
could be seen as predicating the application of his formula on the prior 
determination that there was here a foreseeable risk of harm: “It is not beyond 
reasonable expectation,”80 Hand said, that in the course of drilling barges in 
and out, in winter, in war time, in a crowded harbor, a barge will break loose 
because of negligence by those charged with the job of drilling them in and 
out.  This statement could alternatively be interpreted as an application of the 
probability part of Hand’s formula, however, and the omission of foreseeable 
risk from Judge Hand’s formal statement of the formula both in Carroll 
Towing Co. and in Conway v. O’Brien, as well as in the later case of Moisan v. 
Loftus,81 suggests that Hand intended to exclude foreseeable risk from a 
formula he intended to be the complete statement of the test for negligence. 
Is there any significant difference between the Restatement’s formula for 
determining whether the utility of the actor’s conduct is outweighed by the 
magnitude of its risk of harm to others and Hand’s test of whether the burden 
of taking precautions is greater than the probability multiplied by the gravity of 
the threatened harm?  The factors the Restatement lists as relevant to 
determining the utility of the actor’s conduct can just as reasonably be seen as 
factors relevant to determining the burden of adequate precautions because the 
burden of adequate precautions is equivalent to the foregone utility of the 
actor’s risk-threatening conduct.  Similarly, the factors the Restatement lists as 
relevant in determining the magnitude of the risk could all fit within Judge 
Hand’s reference to probability of harm multiplied by the gravity of the 
resulting injury.  Surely, the elegantly general “gravity of resulting injury” 
could reasonably be understood to refer to the value of the interests threatened 
with harm, the extent of the threatened harm to those interests and the number 
of persons whose interests could be harmed.  All these elements could no 
doubt be considered in any careful attempt to determine the “gravity” of harm.  
Similarly, the Restatement’s “extent of the chance” that the actor’s conduct 
will cause an invasion of any interest of the other or of one of a class of which 
 
 79. Id. § 291(1). 
 80. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 174. 
 81. 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949). 
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the other is a member seems to be succinctly summarized by Judge Hand’s 
“probability of harm.” 
The difference between the two tests thus seems to be a difference only in 
the level of generality at which the test is formulated.  But there may be a 
significant rhetorical advantage in pegging the test at Judge Hand’s higher 
level of generality.  In the Restatement’s balance, reference is made to “the 
value the law attaches” to the different interests on either side of the balance.  
The form of the test itself thus raises the recurring problem with utilitarianism 
or any other form of consequentialist reasoning.  That is the problem of 
identifying a scale that can be used to assign values to different interests or 
outcomes so that those interests or outcomes can be compared rationally.82  
Judge Hand’s formula, by rising to a higher level of generality than the 
Restatement, does not so much solve that problem as submerge it. 
If we conclude that the Hand formula is a simplified version of all or part 
of the unreasonable foreseeable risk test of negligence adopted in the First 
Restatement of Torts, our search for the full pedigree of the Hand formula 
continues, for we must ask where the First Restatement’s test came from.  
After all, courts explaining the negligence standard in the 1920s and 1930s 
ordinarily referred to the conduct of the ordinary reasonable man, not to the 
conduct that poses an unreasonable foreseeable risk of harm to another.83  The 
unreasonable foreseeable risk test thus seems like a theoretical description of 
the ordinary judicial standard for negligence, not a statement of the standard 
itself.  Where did this theoretical redescription come from? 
The origin of the Restatement’s unreasonable foreseeable risk of harm test 
can be identified with a fair degree of certainty.  It seems to have come from 
Henry Taylor Terry’s 1915 article in the Harvard Law Review entitled, 
Negligence.84  In that article, Terry argued that negligence was conduct that 
posed an unreasonable foreseeable risk of harm to others.85  He identified five 
factors on which the reasonableness of a given risk may depend, including the 
magnitude of the risk; the value of that exposed to the risk; the value of the 
actor’s object in acting as he did; the probability that the actor’s object will be 
obtained by the conduct threatening the risk; and the probability that the 
actor’s object would not have been obtained without taking the risk.86  Terry’s 
 
 82. See generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 111-18 (1980). 
 83. See generally PROSSER, supra note 67, at 224-55; 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 30, at 676-
78 (1941). 
 84. Henry Taylor Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915). 
 85. Id. at 42. 
 86. Id. at 42-43. 
(1) The magnitude of the risk.  A risk is more likely to be unreasonable the greater it is. 
(2) The value of importance of that which is exposed to the risk, which is the object that 
the law desires to protect, and may be called the principal object. 
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five factors are described in language substantially the same as that later 
adopted in the First Restatement. 
Henry Taylor Terry evidently arrived at his unreasonable foreseeable risk 
test of negligence by meditating on Holmes’s theory of negligence in The 
Common Law, published in 1881.87  There, Holmes had equated the old, 
inevitable accident defense at common law with the developing negligence 
standard.88  He then explained that the test of “inevitable accident” in the old 
common law cases was whether harm from defendant’s act was foreseeable at 
the time defendant voluntarily acted; if danger was not foreseeable, or if 
defendant did not act voluntarily, the result was inevitable accident.89  
Holmes’s explanation of the negligence standard, then, was simply whether 
danger from the defendant’s conduct was foreseeable at all.  That test, 
however, seemed to be inconsistent with the cases which had consistently held 
that conduct such as riding a horse carefully90 was not negligent even though it 
threatened a foreseeable risk of harm to others, as the horse could be spooked, 
and run away with the rider, and cause harm to others. 
When Holmes published The Common Law, Henry Taylor Terry was stuck 
over in Tokyo with an inadequate library.91  He obtained a copy of The 
Common Law, however, and later clearly identified the problem with Holmes’s 
simple foreseeability test of negligence.  In his 1884 treatise on Anglo-
American law, Terry said this: 
[After stating an objective reasonableness standard under the test of 
negligence]  This I understand to be substantially the same conclusion reached 
by Judge Holmes in his remarkable book on The Common Law, as to the 
nature of what is generally called legal negligence and intention.  He finds the 
unlawful character of the conduct in such cases to depend upon the fact that it 
is likely to cause damage to others rather than upon its having been done with 
 
(3) A person who takes a risk of injuring the principal object usually does so because he 
has some reason of his own for such conduct,—is pursuing some object of his own.  This 
may be called the collateral object.  In some cases, at least, the value or importance of the 
collateral object is properly to be considered in deciding upon the reasonableness of the 
risk. 
(4) The probability that the collateral object will be attained by the conduct which 
involves risk to the principal; the utility of the risk. 
(5) The probability that the collateral object would not have been attained without taking 
the risk; the necessity of the risk. 
Id. 
 87. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 
Belknap Press 1963) (1881). 
 88. Id. at 74-77, 86-88. 
 89. Id. at 74-75. 
 90. Gibbons v. Pepper, 91 Eng. Rep. 922 (1695). 
 91. See Preface to HENRY T. TERRY, SOME LEADING PRINCIPLES OF ANGLO-AMERICAN 
LAW (1884). 
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any bad state of mind.  But, probably because the purpose of his work did not 
call for it, he does not discuss, at least at any length, the question what degree 
of likelihood of damage is sufficient to make the conduct unlawful, there being 
many sorts of conduct which have and are well known to have more or less 
tendency to cause harm to others which are yet perfectly lawful so long as this 
tendency is not too great.  The criterion here is reasonableness.92 
Terry evidently mulled over what the precise test of reasonableness should be 
for the next thirty-one years, publishing his ultimate conclusions in 1915, three 
years after he had returned to the United States from his professorship in 
Tokyo. 
The brilliance of Terry’s achievement can hardly be overemphasized.  He 
preserved Holmes’s basic consequentialist ethic and deterrence rationale for 
negligence liability, provided a theory that was more consistent with the 
negligence rules than Holmes’s theory, and further preserved the legislative 
function of the courts by avoiding a test of negligence in terms of the conduct 
of the ordinary reasonable man. 
So, where did Holmes get his simple foreseeable harm test of inevitable 
accident, and hence of negligence?  The ordinary judicial explanation of the 
negligence standard at the time Holmes wrote was the conduct of the ordinary 
reasonable man.93  There were scattered references in the cases to 
foreseeability,94 but the word was ordinarily used to mean “prudence” or 
“foresight.”95 
The most likely source for Holmes’s focus on simple foreseeable harm as 
the test for negligence is the Comtean positivist philosophy Holmes had 
imbibed in his exhaustive readings of John Stuart Mill’s technical writings in 
philosophy and scientific method.96  Under Comte and Mill’s epistemology: 
We have no knowledge of anything but Phænomena; and our knowledge of 
phænomena is relative, not absolute.  We know not the essence, nor the real 
mode of production, of any fact, but only its relations to other facts in the way 
of succession or of similitude.  These relations are constant; that is, always the 
same in the same circumstances.  The constant resemblances which link 
phænomena together, and the constant sequences which unite them as 
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antecedent and consequent, are termed their laws.  The laws of phænomena are 
all we know respecting them.97 
Luckily for us, however, these laws are all we ever need or want to know: 
[T]he knowledge which mankind, even in the earliest ages, chiefly pursued, 
being that which they most needed, was foreknowledge: “savoir, pour 
prevoir.”  When they sought for the cause, it was mainly in order to control the 
effect, or if it was uncontrollable, to foreknow and adapt their conduct to it.  
Now, all foresight of phænomena, and power over them, depend on knowledge 
of their sequences, and not upon any notion we may have formed respecting 
their origin or inmost nature.  We foresee a fact or event by means of facts 
which are signs of it, because experience has shown them to be its antecedents.  
We bring about any fact, other than our own muscular contractions, by means 
of some fact which experience has shown to be followed by it.  All foresight, 
therefore, and all intelligent action, have only been possible in proportion as 
men have successfully attempted to ascertain the successions of phænomena.98 
Holmes’s foreseeability explanation of the negligence standard perfectly 
embodies this positivist notion of foresight based on scientific laws of 
antecedence and consequence.  The negligence question is left to the jury, 
Holmes said, in order to consult the experience of mankind with the danger of 
certain conduct under certain circumstances99—that is, to find out the relevant 
laws of antecedence and consequence that allow us to foresee danger to others 
under certain circumstances.100  The general test of foreseeability by the 
ordinary reasonable person, then, should continually be giving way to more 
specific rules of conduct that embody the law of antecedence and consequence 
the jury or the legislature has learned from the common experience of 
mankind.101  These specific rules are preferred to the general foreseeability 
standard.102  Specific rules are more fixed, definite and certain than the test of 
danger foreseeable by the ordinary reasonable man.  Those specific rules are 
therefore more knowable and hence more effective at deterring dangerous 
conduct.103  The critical question for Holmes, then, was not simple 
foreseeability by the ordinary reasonable man, but the specific laws of 
antecedence and consequence that enable us to foresee harm from certain 
conduct under certain circumstances. 
The origin and peculiarly evanescent place of the foreseeability test in 
Holmes’s theoretical description of the negligence standard perhaps explains 
 
 97. JOHN STUART MILL, AUGUSTE COMTE AND POSITIVISM 6 (Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 
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Judge Hand’s refusal to include foreseeability in his simplified reformulation 
of the unreasonable foreseeable risk test.  Learned Hand was a friend and 
admirer of Holmes.104  In addition, Hand was imbued with the progressives’ 
respect for progress through “scientific” decision-making.105  The Hand 
formula, deleting foreseeability from the unreasonable foreseeable risk test, 
makes that test more scientific: you do not need to use that weaselly creature, 
the ordinary reasonable man, with his penchant for sentiment and outmoded 
custom, who may upset the purely objective calculation of costs and benefits.  
Although Judge Hand admitted in Conway 106 and Moisan v. Loftus107 that one 
could not quantify precisely all the elements in his formula, at least the 
elements are objective facts that can be estimated within ranges with more or 
less accuracy to guide rational decision-making.  Holmes’s dream of scientific 
judicial decision-making could thus perhaps be achieved.  And what better 
place to start than in admiralty cases in the Second Circuit, where negligence 
decisions dealing with all those engaged in a single industry, in a definite 
geographic area, are made by trial judges and reviewed by a single court.  
Repeated applications of the Hand formula would result in an objective, 
scientific set of holdings that could provide effective guidance to those in 
maritime transportation.  This in turn could serve as a guide to rational 
decision making in negligence cases in other fields. 
Alas, if those were Judge Hand’s goals, it was not to be, as the subsequent 
history of the Hand formula in factually-similar Second Circuit cases and in 
negligence cases elsewhere suggest. 
V.  THE INFLUENCE OF THE HAND FORMULA 
A. Factually Similar Cases in The Second Circuit 
The Carroll Towing case was decided in 1947.  In 1948 and 1949 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided two remarkably 
similar cases in ways more consistent with the underlying practices and their 
purpose. 
In 1948 in New York Trap Rock Corp. v. Christie Scow Corp.,108 the owner 
of a scow sued in admiralty for damages caused by the sinking of its scow after 
it was struck by floating ice while moored in an exposed position at a pier on 
the Hudson River.  At that time the river had large fields of floating ice in its 
course.  There were safer, less exposed moorings available nearby; the decision 
to moor at the exposed pier was made by the tugmaster.  The tugboat company 
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urged that the scow owner was at fault as well, because the bargee had left the 
scow unattended on the Sunday that she was sunk.  The court decided for the 
scow-owner in an opinion by Augustus Hand for a panel that included Learned 
Hand and Jerome Frank, another judge who had been on the Carroll Towing 
Co. panel.  Judge Augustus Hand recognized that “the tugmaster was a much 
better judge of what—because of stress of weather—was a safe berth for the 
[scow] than the bargee.”109  He went on, with a nod to the Carroll Towing Co. 
case, to conclude: “we cannot hold that the danger of injury to the scow from 
floating ice was so evident to one of the limited experience and skill of a 
bargee as to render him or [his employer] responsible for leaving the vessel at 
[the exposed dock][citing Carroll Towing Co.].”110  The court thus couched its 
opinion in language of foreseeable danger, consistent with the Carroll Towing 
Co. holding, if not with Learned Hand’s formula, which excluded 
foreseeability altogether.  The foreseeability test used by the court in New York 
Trap Rock, moreover, was the danger evident to the bargee of “limited 
experience and skill [as compared to the tugmaster].”111  Thus the court built 
into the foreseeability test the customary pattern of coordination, in which the 
bargee relies on the experience and expertise of the tugmaster to choose safe 
berths for the barge. 
In 1949 the Second Circuit, by a panel comprised of Judges Swan, Chase 
and Smith, decided the case of Burns Brothers v. Long Island Railroad Co.112  
Judge Chase had been on the panel that decided the Carroll Towing Co. case, 
and he wrote the opinion in Burns Brothers.  Four carfloats owned by different 
railroads were moored in a tier out from a rack maintained by the Long Island 
Railroad.  Tugs operated by the Erie Railroad and the Long Island Railroad 
cooperated to remove the last carfloat from the tier.  Shortly after this, the 
second carfloat in the tier broke loose, and it and the carfloat attached to it 
floated away, eventually smashing into libellant’s downstream coal barge.  The 
appellate court held that the Central Railroad, which owned the carfloat that 
broke loose from the flotilla, was not negligent in failing to have a floatman on 
board.  Judge Chase distinguished the Carroll Towing Co. case as follows: 
[The carfloat here] is to be distinguished from . . . the barge in United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co., . . . on which living quarters for a bargee were maintained 
and a bargee was ordinarily present; his absence during a considerable part of 
his customary working hours was held inexcusable under the circumstances 
and to be negligence attributable to the barge owner.  In contrast, no living 
quarters are provided on a float and it is not customary to keep a man aboard; 
there was therefore no reason for the Long Island to rely upon the presence of 
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a floatman in conducting its operations or for the Central to anticipate that the 
Long Island would conduct its operations in such a manner as to make the 
presence of a floatman necessary.113 
The Burns Brothers court thus reinterpreted the Carroll Towing Co. 
holding solely in terms of customary practices and their related reliance and 
expectation relationships.  Burns Brothers was distinguished on the basis of 
lack of custom to keep a floatman on board a moored carfloat, and the carfloat 
owner’s consequent reliance on the drilling-out tugs and the custodian of the 
floats that moored at the custodian’s rack to keep the carfloat from breaking 
loose. Nowhere, of course, was Judge Hand’s negligence calculus mentioned.  
Burns Brothers authoritatively reinterpreted the Carroll Towing Co. holding in 
terms of customary standards. 
B. Other Courts in Other Times 
Admiralty cases in the Second Circuit provided the best opportunity for 
Judge Hand to get his formula adopted as law.  Federal judges try admiralty 
cases without a jury.  The judge both finds the facts and makes judgments 
about whether on those facts, a party was negligent.  These decisions may be 
reviewed on appeal, and appellate decisions in admiralty become precedent on 
what constitutes negligence under particular circumstances.  A different 
procedure altogether exists for determining the law of negligence at the 
common law in the United States.  Juries, not judges, determine the facts of the 
case and make the judgment about whether on those facts a party was 
negligent.  Juries do not write opinions and their decisions are not reviewed on 
appeal; only the trial court’s decisions are reviewable and those decisions are 
necessarily on the periphery of the central negligence issue.  All that can be 
appealed are decisions on whether to dismiss a negligence complaint for failure 
to state a good claim, to take the negligence issue from the jury, to instruct the 
jury on the elements of a negligence determination or to rule on the 
admissibility of evidence in a negligence action.  In none of these rulings 
except the rare directed verdict do either the trial or appellate courts decide that 
the defendant was or was not negligent on the facts.  In the common law 
system, then, it is much more difficult for the Hand formula to become law as 
the legal test for determining whether a party was negligent.  The clearest way 
for it to become law would be for judges to instruct the jury that they are to use 
the Hand formula to determine whether a party was negligent.  Stephen 
Gilles114 has confirmed what this author had earlier suggested:115 judges 
ordinarily instruct juries on the negligence issue to determine whether the actor 
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behaved as a “reasonably prudent person” or an “ordinary reasonable person.”  
Judges do not ordinarily instruct juries on the negligence issue to balance the 
costs and benefits of greater care. 
So how can some casebook authors and other academics claim that the 
Hand formula is the legal standard for determining negligence?  Here, too, 
Stephen Gilles has supplied us with an answer.  In reviewing trial judges’ 
rulings on the periphery of the ultimate negligence decisions by juries, 
appellate courts sometimes explain their decisions by invoking the Hand 
formula or some variant of the unreasonable foreseeable risk test as the real 
meaning of the negligence standard.116  Often, the court citing the Hand 
formula will equate it with the unreasonable foreseeable risk test.  In some of 
those Hand-citing cases the court rules that certain conduct is not negligence as 
a matter of law, or that certain conduct is negligent as a matter of law.  Those 
cases, of course, are rare.  But one may question whether even those cases 
make the Hand formula the legal standard of negligence.  As long as the trial 
judges in those states continue to instruct juries that negligence is the failure to 
act as an ordinary reasonable person, the appellate courts’ use of the Hand 
formula to explain or justify its decision may be seen as a theoretical 
description of the negligence standard, or as a summary of the significant 
factors relevant to a negligence judgment, or as one way, on certain kinds of 
facts, to determine what an ordinary reasonable person would do or not do.  
Moreover, if one looks closely at judicial reasoning in cases purporting to 
apply the Hand formula or an unreasonable foreseeable risk version of the 
Hand formula, one sees the courts subtly equating the conduct required by the 
community’s pre-existing safety conventions with the precautions required by 
the Hand formula.117 
We can see this tendency at work in the leading opinion of our most 
brilliant judicial advocate of the Hand formula, Judge Richard Posner.  In a 
series of opinions for the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit,118 Judge Posner has suggested repeatedly that the only barrier 
to a wholly quantified application of the Hand formula in a negligence case is 
the repeated failure of attorneys to present the appropriate evidence.  Judge 
Posner in McCarty v. Pheasant Run,119 a case sometimes cited in the 
casebooks,120 even coached attorneys about what evidence they should 
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introduce if they wanted negligence determined as a matter of law by a judge 
using the Hand formula.121 
Even Judge Posner, however, tacitly defers to customary practice in his 
application of the Hand formula, as we can see by analyzing another of Judge 
Posner’s opinions beloved by the casebook authors122—United States Fidelity 
& Guarantee Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba.123  In that case, Judge 
Posner wrote the opinion in an appeal from a trial court judgment for a ship-
owner. Plaintiff sued for the death of a longshoreman who had worked on 
defendant’s ship and was found dead at the bottom of a darkened hold, having 
fallen twenty-five feet through an open, unlighted hatch in the upper ‘tween 
deck.  The longshoreman had worked in that area earlier in the day when it was 
lit and the hatch was closed.  After the longshoreman crew had finished and 
gone to work in another hold, the ship’s crew opened the hatch in the upper 
‘tween decks, as well as the hatch directly below in the lower ‘tween deck, and 
then closed the hatch above in the weather deck, plunging the hold and its open 
hatches into darkness.  This was done pursuant to a customary practice of 
opening the ‘tween deck hatches before sailing to expedite unloading upon 
reaching the next destination.  The doomed longshoreman evidently reentered 
the upper ‘tween decks from an open doorway.  Cases of liquor were stored in 
the forward area, beyond the open hatch.  The longshoreman’s body was found 
below the forward part of the open hatch.  The obvious inference was that he 
had reentered the darkened ‘tween decks area to steal some liquor, skirted to 
the side of the open hatch until he was close to the liquor, and then stumbled 
into the hatch opening to his death below.  Plaintiff sued under the 
Longshoreman and Harbor Worker’s Act, which excludes the defenses of 
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk.124 
In ruling on the various procedural questions on appeal, Judge Posner 
recognized the Carroll Towing Co. negligence formula as “a valuable aid to 
clear thinking about the factors that are relevant to a judgment of negligence 
and about the relationship among those factors”125 even though “the formula 
does not yield mathematically precise results in practice, [since the burden of 
precautions, the probability and potential gravity of harm have never all been 
quantified] in an actual lawsuit.”126  Applying the formula to resolve Plaintiff’s 
claim that the facts established the ship-owner’s negligence as a matter of law, 
Judge Posner found that the projected loss if an accident occurred was large, as 
a twenty-five-foot fall through the open hatch to the bottom of the hold was 
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very likely to cause serious injury or death.127  The burden of precautions was 
relatively small, though, as the shipowner could have avoided such an accident 
easily and cheaply by lighting the hold, locking the entrance doorway, roping 
off the open hatch or waiting until all longshoremen were ashore before 
opening the ‘tween deck hatches and closing the weather deck hatch.128 
But, Judge Posner found that the probability of such an accident was 
“probably” low.129  It was unlikely that a longshoreman would go back into a 
darkened area for any legitimate purpose without a light, since he could easily 
ask for one.  As to the probability of longshoremen entering for illegitimate 
purposes, the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proving that “it is common 
for longshoremen to try to pilfer from darkened holds.”130  Moreover, the 
relevant probability was not that a longshoreman would enter a darkened hold 
but that he would fall into an open hatch in a darkened hold, and this 
probability is even smaller, since the darkness in the hold together with any 
entering longshoreman’s knowledge of a hatch that might be open, limits this 
probability to cases of reckless entering longshoremen.  Finally, the ship-
owner knew that the stevedoring company had a work rule forbidding its 
longshoremen from wandering away from the stevedoring operation.  This 
further reduced the foreseeable probability of accident, as “[t]he shipowner 
was entitled to rely on the stevedore to enforce this rule, if not 100 percent at 
least enough to make [an accident under all the circumstances] highly 
improbable . . .”131 
Finally, Judge Posner recognized that defendant’s compliance with 
customary practice was relevant to a determination of whether the conduct was 
cost-justified under the Carroll Towing Co. formula.  This was so, according to 
Judge Posner, because stevedoring companies are strictly liable for any work-
related injury to their employees.  If the ship-owner’s practice of leaving 
hatches open in darkened holds costs the stevedoring companies significant 
sums in compensation payments, they would raise their charges to ship-
owners.  If the cost to the ship-owners of foregoing the practice was less than 
these additional charges, they would forego the practice.  The fact that ship-
owners as a group persist in the practice is, therefore, “some evidence, though 
not conclusive, that the practice is cost-justified, and not negligence.”132 
Judge Posner’s opinion in the United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. case 
is a brilliant tour de force, but a close look suggests there is less here than 
meets the eye.  First of all, Judge Posner’s economic argument for the 
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relevance of industry custom seems unrealistic, for it assumes that the 
increased accident costs falling on the strictly-liable stevedores will directly 
influence the practices of ship-owners.  Posner’s argument conjures up a vision 
of a stevedoring bill, broken down into its various components, with worker’s 
compensation costs categorized by type of accident.  But that bill is a pipe 
dream of economists.  However unrealistic, Posner’s argument strikes a 
responsive chord because we already know that customary practices are 
relevant to a determination of negligence simply because negligence is a 
breach of a social norm,133 and customs usually embody the relevant norm. 
Judge Posner’s arguments on the probability of accidental injury are 
similarly transparent, revealing the underlying practices and expectations that 
make his conclusion obviously correct.  The probability that someone working 
around liquor will pilfer it is relatively high: ask any bar owner or caterer about 
the “tote” problem.  Posner’s argument on the low probability of a 
longshoreman’s attempt to pilfer the liquor here seems contrary to facts about 
human weakness that a judge is entitled to notice.  If he had wanted to reach a 
different result, he could easily have taken judicial notice of this high 
probability; relying instead on plaintiff’s failure to meet his burden of proof 
seems an artful way to make the Carroll Towing Co.  test come out with the 
obviously correct result.  The reason why the defendant is not negligent here is 
that we do not expect people to take precautions solely to protect thieves from 
accidental injury, and we therefore do not develop safety practices to protect 
those attempting to steal from us.  Thieves are not within the class that the 
defendant ship-owner owed a duty to protect against accidental injury; the jury 
could reasonably find the doomed longshoreman was attempting to steal liquor 
from the hold; even though this attempt was highly probable, the ship-owner 
had no duty to light areas holding pilferable cargo to ensure that a thief could 
steal safely. 
Judge Posner’s arguments are unpersuasive when considered as arguments 
on probability; as partial and incomplete fragments of the above argument, 
however, they form part of a coherent whole in which we perhaps 
unconsciously place them.  Judge Posner’s arguments themselves appeal to 
that whole: he points out that the only real hazard here is a hazard to thieves; 
he suggests that a thief would be on notice of the possible danger and would 
have to be reckless to be hurt; he tells us that the ship-owner is “entitled to 
rely” on the stevedore enforcing its relevant work rule-a rule that is at least in 
part aimed at preventing longshoremen from pilfering cargo.  These implicit 
references to a totally different basis for decision help persuade us that the 
decision is correct. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Assume, if you will, that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals is the 
highest appellate court in the independent country of Secundum Circuitum.  
Assume further that you are preparing a casebook to teach torts in the year 
2001 to young law students preparing to practice law in that country.  Would 
you include the Carroll Towing Co. case in that casebook?  I submit that you 
would not, for the following reasons.  The court in Carroll Towing Co. derived 
a test from the prior relevant cases pitched at too high a level of generalization.  
That, in turn, led the court to attempt to distinguish the controlling prior 
precedent—The Reno—in an unreasonable way.  Moreover, the result flatly 
contradicts currently accepted doctrines of cause-in-fact and proximate cause.  
The overly-general test the court announced in the Carroll Towing Co. case 
was given lip-service by the same court in subsequent cases, while it sub 
silentio equated the test with accepted customary conduct.  Thus, the case was 
wrongly decided ab initio and had no significant influence.  It is not a leading 
case in the country of Secundum Circuitum.  Including it in a torts casebook 
would give students a false impression of its significance and might undermine 
one’s ability to teach the cause-in-fact and proximate cause doctrines in 
negligence law. 
If you would not include the Carroll Towing Co.  case in a torts casebook 
for the independent country of Secondum Circuitum, why is it given such a 
prominent place in American torts casebooks?  It goes back, I think, to the 
extraordinary power casebook authors have in the United States.  Without the 
discipline that comes from having to teach the substantive law of a single 
jurisdiction, casebook authors can pick and choose: a dab of this, a little of 
that.  So the Carroll Towing Co. case, and its “Hand formula” get included, not 
because it is the law anywhere, but because it is an elegant theory about the 
negligence standard, written by a respected progressive judge.  The Carroll 
Towing Co. opinion is includible in a casebook because it meets the minimum 
requirement that it be an opinion in an actual case.  But most casebook authors 
take it out of its context in a series of cases developing the law in a particular 
jurisdiction and edit it down so the real issues in the case are almost impossible 
to recognize.  In the form in which it is presented in most casebooks, then, 
Carroll Towing Co. is simply theory masquerading as law.  Yet only two 
casebooks134 present the Hand formula as simply a theory about the negligence 
standard. 
The way the Carroll Towing Co. case is presented in most casebooks 
contributes to the recurring confusion in the United States between the law of 
negligence and descriptive theories of negligence.  This goes back to Holmes, 
who first redescribed the ordinary reasonable man standard in terms of 
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foreseeable danger to others.  It can be traced through Henry Taylor Terry, 
who remodeled Holmes’s foreseeable danger theory into the unreasonable 
foreseeable risk theory; it came down to Hand, who left out the foreseeability 
requirement altogether to adopt a purely utilitarian balancing theory.  Hand’s 
test, gussied up as marginal analysis, is now the delight of the law and 
economics school.  But none of it started out as law.  Each test started as a 
descriptive theory of the negligence standard.  Only later did Terry’s test have 
an influence on the decisions of judges, and then its influence was spotty, 
sporadic and peripheral.  So it has been with the Hand formula as well.135 
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